
System Register Hijacking: Compromising Kernel Integrity By Turning System Registers Against the System

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




Linux Kernel Control Flow Hijacking



Mitigations



Back in 2017...

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Exploiting the Linux kernel via packet sockets

Guest blog post, posted by Andrey Konovalov

- c. Overflow the block and overwrite retire_blk_timer field. Make retire_blk_timer->func point to native_write_cr4 and make retire_blk_timer->data equal to the desired CR4 value.
- d. Wait for the timer to be executed, now we have SMEP & SMAP disabled on the current core.

"Security-Sensitive System Registers"

Mitigation Enforcement

• cr0, cr4, EFLAGS, MSR_EFER

Architectural Structure Information

• cr3, IDTR, GDTR, GSBASE

System Register Hijacking

We propose System Register Hijacking (SRH) as a class of exploitation techniques which involve writes to Security-Sensitive System Registers via Control Flow Hijacking in order to bypass mitigations or expand attacker capabilities.

System Register Hijacking Techniques

cr4: Bypass SMEP/SMAP

cr0: Bypass Write Protect

EFLAGS.AC: Temporarily Bypass SMAP

GSBASE: Bypass FineIBT

... see the paper for more

SWAPGS Stack Pivoting

A universal stack pivoting gadget and FineIBT bypass on x86-64 Linux.

The technique reuses code from syscall entrypoints:

• endbr64 → swapgs → mov rsp, gs:xxxx

Entrypoints are architecturally *required* to start with **endbr64** under IBT.

Outcomes

FineIBT Paranoid was introduced by Linux kernel developers, which adds a CFI check on the caller-side, mitigating our bypass.

A **specification change** was made to Intel's upcoming feature, Flexible Return and Event Delivery (FRED), to no longer require **endbr64** at FRED entrypoints.

Read the Paper:



https://tinyurl.com/srhpaper







Thank You!

Jennifer Miller









